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Abstract Many recent analyses of mood selection in Romance and Balkan rely
on the idea that subjunctive is triggered by a modal predicate whose meaning is
comparative. We work out a precise version of this idea, which we call the proto-
standard theory, and show that it runs into problems with a variety of indicative-
selecting predicates in French. We then develop and argue in favor of an alternative
account based on individuals being contextually committed towards the modal
parameters used to give the meaning of the predicate.
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1 Overview
This paper concerns the semantic and pragmatic factors that are behind verbal mood
marking – the contrast between indicative and subjunctive seen in (1)-(2) – in the
complements of propositional attitude predicates. We focus on cases in which choice
of mood depends on the attitude expressed by the embedding predicate,1 and we
limit our attention here to data from French.2
(1) Pierre
Pierre
croit
believes
que
that
Marie
Marie
est
is.IND
heureuse.
happy
(2) Pierre
Pierre
veut
wants
que
that
Marie
Marie
soit
is.SBJV
heureuse.
happy
How is the mood selection of attitude predicates determined? When we review much
of the recent formal work on mood, we find a common intuition that mood selection
is sensitive to the semantics of comparison. Attitudes of desire, like ‘want’, are said
to be comparative because they describe a preference for one alternative over others.
∗We thank Graham Katz, Elena Herburger, Donka Farkas, Anastasia Giannakidou, Valentine Hac-
quard, and Philippe Schlenker for discussion and feedback, and are grateful to our consultant,
Delphine Kanyandekwe, for offering her judgments. This research was supported by National
Science Foundation grant no. BCS-1053038. All remaining errors are our own.
1 Other factors which may affect mood selection are not discussed here.
2 All French data without citation were provided by our consultant, Delphine Kanyandekwe.
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Belief, on the other hand, is seen as not being comparative in this way. We present
this approach below in its distilled form as the proto-standard analysis of mood.
While the proto-standard analysis carries important insights and succeeds in
predicting the mood selection of a wide range of attitude predicates, we show that
it runs into problems with some of the predicates that have not previously been
studied in detail. There exist a number of predicates (e.g., espérer ‘hope’, promettre
‘promise’, probable ‘probable’) that have a preference-based comparative semantics
despite selecting for indicative complements. We will argue in favor of a different
analysis of mood selection in French which is based on the concept of contextual
commitment to modal (conversational) backgrounds. We associate indicative mood
with a presupposition of commitment: a presupposition that relevant individuals
are prepared to defend the modal background of the attitude as being reasonable
and appropriate. This analysis leaves room for attitude predicates that select for the
indicative despite having a semantics involving comparison.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the proto-standard
analysis in detail and point out some problems for it. In Section 3, we argue that the
concept of contextual commitment is helpful in explaining mood selection in the
cases that are problematic for the proto-standard view. Contextual commitment is
made more precise in Section 4, where we also propose a presuppositional analysis
of mood morphemes and apply it to the key examples. Section 5 compares our
proposal to others in the literature, and Section 6 summarizes our main contributions.
2 The Proto-Standard Analysis
In this section, we develop what we call the PROTO-STANDARD ANALYSIS of verbal
mood. We first bring out what we see as the core idea shared by much recent
semantically oriented work on verbal mood, and we give a formal version which
highlights the shared central idea. We call it a “proto” standard, and not simply the
“standard”, both because the similarities among various previous approaches have
not been fully acknowledged in the literature, and also because we do not wish to
hide the fact that there are many differences among them. By focusing on what is
shared, we will be able to drive new insights into the nature of verbal mood.
MOOD SELECTION refers to the case where the verbal mood form in an embed-
ded clause is determined by a matrix predicate which takes that clause as a semantic
argument. Such predicates always have a modal semantics, broadly construed. For
example, on the classical approach of Hintikka (1961), propositional attitude predi-
cates like believe are a type of strong modal, expressing universal quantification over
a set of accessible worlds determined by the predicate and its arguments (i.e., a  in
modal logic). More recently, scholars interested in explaining mood selection have
developed analyses based on more sophisticated theories of modality, in particular
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the framework of Kratzer (1981, 1991, 2012). Crucially, they follow Kratzer in
assuming that the semantics of modal elements makes use of two parameters in place
of the accessibility relation of modal logic. These parameters, the modal base and
ordering source, are each a function from worlds to sets of propositions, and their
semantic roles may be described as follows:
• The modal base specified by the predicate P, fP, determines the set of possible
worlds relevant to the truth conditions of a clause headed by P.
• The ordering source specified by the predicate P, gP, ranks the worlds relevant
according to fP, establishing a partial pre-order which contributes to the truth
conditions of a clause headed by P.
Kratzer defines various modal operators using these two parameters. Two that have
been used in the analysis of attitude predicates are necessity in (3) (simplified from
the original definition), and weak necessity, in (4) (Kratzer 1991):
(3) [[ PN q ]] = True in w iff q is true in all worlds compatible with fP(w) that are
best according to gP(w).
(4) [[ PWN q ]] = True in w iff q is better than ¬q according to fP(w) and gP(w).
As pointed out by von Fintel & Iatridou (2008), these definitions are very close and
may be indistinguishable under the Limit Assumption. We base our discussion on
(4), because it is closer to the definitions of subjunctive-selecting predicates used in
the literature on mood, and because it more directly reflects the intuition behind the
proto-standard analysis.
Following Stalnaker (1984); Heim (1992); Giorgi & Pianesi (1997); von Fin-
tel (1999); Villalta (2008), we can treat ‘want’ as using a doxastic modal base
(DOX(a,w), what the subject believes) and buletic ordering source (BUL(a,w),
what he desires). A sentence like John wants Fido to get a rabies shot is true, ac-
cording to (4), if among the worlds compatible with what John believes, the worlds
in which Fido gets a rabies shot are more desired by John than the ones in which he
does not (in light of the priority that Fido is not quarantined).
Note that, although the general form of truth conditions for strong modals and
propositional attitude predicates is as in (3)-(4), nothing requires that the ordering
source play a significant role. If gP happens to be empty, (4) reduces to (5),3 Kratzer’s
simple necessity, which is equivalent to the classical modal logic definition of :
(5) [[ PSN q ]] = True in w iff q is entailed by fP(w).
The majority of recent semantic analyses of verbal mood make use of this general
picture of the semantics of propositional attitude predicates, and based on it, they
3 This is also the case if gP(w) is trivial, e.g., if it is a subset of fP(w). We assume that non-empty
ordering sources are not trivial in what follows.
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propose, in essence, that a predicate P selects the subjunctive if its ordering source
gP is not empty. Put less formally, they say that a predicate selects the subjunctive if
it has a COMPARATIVE semantics, and the indicative otherwise. Assume that vouloir
‘want’ and croire ‘believe’ have meanings as follows:
(6) [[ a vouloir q ]] = True in w iff q is better than ¬q according to DOX(a,w)
and BUL(a,w).
(7) [[ a croire q ]] = True in w iff q is entailed by DOX(a,w).
Here we represent plainly the idea that vouloir has a comparative semantics, while
croire does not. Given this, vouloir is predicted to select the subjunctive and croire
the indicative. As we saw in (1)-(2), this is correct for French.
We can state the “proto-standard analysis” informally as follows:
(8) PROTO-STANDARD ANALYSIS OF MOOD: A predicate P selects the sub-
junctive iff its ordering source, gP, is not empty, leading to a comparative
semantics.
Many scholars have worked with the idea that a comparative semantics or non-null
ordering source is a factor which triggers subjunctive (including Anand & Hacquard
2012; Farkas 1992, 2003; Giannakidou 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999; Giorgi & Pianesi
1997; Smirnova 2011; Villalta 2000, 2006, 2008). For some of these a comparative
semantics is only one factor among several affecting mood selection (e.g., Farkas;
Giorgi & Pianesi), and for some importance of this factor is only apparent upon
close examination (e.g., Giannakidou; Smirnova). Our formalization draws most
directly on the work of Giorgi & Pianesi and Villalta. We will briefly discuss how
some of these works relate to our own proposal in Section 5.
2.1 Formalizing the proto-standard analysis
In order to make the analysis more precise, we need to provide a general characteri-
zation of what it is for a modal or attitude predicate to have a comparative semantics.
Doing so requires many details to be filled in, including the precise definition of
“better than”, what it means for an ordering source to be (non) empty, and the role
of the individual arguments in the semantics. In (9) we formalize the proto-standard
theory in terms of the most standard and well-known version of the ordering-based
approach to modality, that of Kratzer (1981, 1991, 2012). We do not wish to dismiss
other ways of thinking about the relevant predicates; in particular, important ideas
about the nature of comparison have been put forth by Heim (1992); Villalta (2008);
Levinson (2003); Lassiter (2011), but integrating them would not make a difference
to the points we make. Because it aims to be general, our definition does not include
464
Mood and Contextual Commitment
a number of presuppositions discussed in the literature for specific attitudes, for
example that fwant is compatible with both q and ¬q (Heim 1992).4
(9) THE PROTO-STANDARD ANALYSIS OF MOOD (formal version)
(a) The Subjunctive
For any propositional attitude predicate P with complement argument S, P
selects the subjunctive form of S iff
i. P has a comparative semantics: [[ P ]] =
λq〈λyλx〉λw[∀w′ ∈⋂ fP〈(x)(y)〉(w)∩ (W–[[ q ]] ),
∃w′′ ∈⋂ fP〈(x)(y)〉(w)∩ [[ q ]] such that w′′ ≤gP〈(x)(y)〉(w) w′;
and not vice versa]; and
ii. P places requirements on gP implying that, for any x, y, and w for
which gP〈(x)(y)〉(w) is defined, gP〈(x)(y)〉(w) 6= /0.
(b) The Indicative
For any propositional attitude predicate P with complement argument S,
P selects the indicative form of S iff the conditions for P selecting the
subjunctive form of S are not met.
Having now given a precise version of the proto-standard theory, we will sum-
marize its major advantages (Section 2.2), point out a few open issues (Section 2.3),
and lay out a number of problems (Section 2.4).
2.2 Where the proto-standard analysis works well
Subjunctives which work well
The following important classes of subjunctive-selecting predicates are accounted
for by the proto-standard theory:
• Verbs of desire (like vouloir ‘want’ above).
• Regretter ‘regret’ and other emotive factive predicates.
• Ordonner ‘order’ and other directives.
We already have discussed vouloir above. Emotive factives also select subjunctive
in French, as seen in (10):
(10) Je
I
regrette
regret
qu’il
that it
ait
has.SBJV
plu.
rained
4 In (9a), we make provision for the fact that predicates take varying numbers of individual arguments:
〈λyλx〉 indicates the possibility that P takes a subject and object argument, and 〈(x)(y)〉 shows where
they will be taken as argument by fP and gP within the definition.
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The “emotive” component of meaning can be accounted for in terms of a comparative
semantics; for example, the meaning of regretter involves the assertion that the
subject disprefers the complement proposition, as compared to its negation. An
ordering source derived from a buletic one by negating the component propositions
can represent this aspect of its meaning.
Directives also select subjunctive:
(11) J’ordonne
I order
qu’il
that he
vienne.
come.SBJV
Here too the semantics is naturally thought of as comparative. The sentence asserts
that the complement is ranked higher than its negation in terms of requirements
(represented with a deontic ordering source) imposed by the subject.
Indicatives which work well
The proto-standard theory also accounts for a number of classes of indicative-
selecting predicates:
• Positive verbs of mental judgment (like croire ‘believe’ above).
• Dire ‘say’ and other verbs of assertion.
• Rêver ‘dream’ and other verbs of fiction and imagination.
• Sûr ‘sure’ and other predicates of certainty.
We have already discussed croire above. Assuming that its meaning only requires
a doxastic modal base, and no ordering source, the fact that it selects indicative in
French is accounted for. Similarly, there is no reason to suspect that the next two
classes, verbs of assertion and fiction verbs, would require an ordering source. Verbs
of assertion make use of a modal base corresponding to the common ground of a
reported conversation, as in (12):
(12) Je
I
dis
say
que
that
le
the
temps
weather
est
is.IND
beau.
pretty
Fiction/imagination verbs’ modal bases encode the facts in the fictive landscape:
(13) J’ai rêvé
I dreamed
qu’il
that he
était
was.IND
président.
president
Predicates of certainty, which also take the indicative as in (14), work out if we think
of them as using a modal base containing propositions of which the subject is sure.
(14) Je
I
suis
am
sûr
sure
qu’il
that he
est
is.IND
bon
good
étudiant.
student
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There is, however, an intuition that sûr expresses a subjective feeling on the part of
the subject, and it would be natural to encode this via an ordering source, parallel to
the “emotive” meaning of emotive factives. We will not pursue this point further,
however, because we wish to be conservative in our judgment of what constitutes a
problem for the proto-standard view.5
2.3 Open issues for the proto-standard analysis: subjunctives
The classic modal adjectives possible and nécessaire select the subjunctive in French,
and this fact raises issues for the proto-standard theory. Beginning with possible,
the first thing to point out is that, because the modal force is not necessity, it doesn’t
fit into the definition of a subjunctive-selecting predicate in (9a). Thus, the analysis
should be reformulated so as to leave open the modal force of the predicate. More
significant is the fact that it is not clear that possible always involves comparison.
(15) Il
it
est
is
possible
possible
que
that
cet
this
échantillon
sample
soit
is.SBJV
dissout
dissolved
dans
in
l’eau.
the water
(15) can be seen as expressing pure circumstantial modality; it states that the sample
being dissolved is compatible with a set of relevant facts, with no additional ordering
source information involved. If this is the case, possible does not fit with the analysis
of subjunctive under the proto-standard theory. We can, however, think of a number
of reasonable things that a proponent of that theory could say about these cases based
on the fact that other uses of possible, for example deontic ones, clearly do involve
an ordering source. One option would be to reformulate (9a) so that all it requires is
that gP be sometimes non-empty; this might prove too weak for other predicates,
however. Another would be to say that, because possible uses an ordering source
on some of its readings, it has been grammaticalized as taking subjunctive on all
uses. While this move would take us away from a pure semantically-based theory of
mood selection, it is likely that we will need to invoke grammaticalization at some
point in our analysis of mood in any case.
If we were to assume that nécessaire can be analyzed as a simple, modal-
logic style , it too would be expected not to take subjunctive (at least on some
uses). However, ‘necessary’ always seems to involve a priority (often, teleological)
interpretation (Rubinstein 2012):6
(16) Il
it
est
is
nécessaire
necessary
que
that
cet
this
échantillon
sample
soit
is.SBJV
dissout
dissolved
dans
in
l’eau.
the water
5 We believe that our own approach is able to account for the mood selection in this case, even on the
assumption that ‘sure’ has an ordering source.
6 We are setting aside any technical philosophical uses of ‘necessary’, but if there are some uses which
do not require an ordering source, we would argue that subjunctive mood is grammaticalized, as with
‘possible’.
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Example (16) has a teleological meaning: the sample dissolving is necessary in light
of some goal. Thus, nécessaire works correctly under the proto-standard theory.
2.4 Problems for the proto-standard analysis: indicatives
Finally we turn to the significant problems which arise for the proto-standard analy-
sis. These problems have to do with a number of predicates which take the indicative,
despite having meanings which clearly involve a component which will be repre-
sented via an ordering source within the ordering semantics framework assumed by
the proto-standard theory. The crucial predicates we will discuss are the following:
• Espérer ‘hope’ (compare to vouloir ‘want’).
• Promettre ‘promise’ (compare to ordonner ‘order’).
• Probable ‘probable’ (compare to possible ‘possible’).
We begin with a number of examples showing that espérer takes the indicative:
(17) (a) Jean
Jean
espère
hopes
toujours
always
que
that
Marie
Marie
va
go.IND
venir.
come.INF
(b) J’espère
I hope
que
that
tu
you
fais
make.IND
l’effort
the effort
d’écouter
to listen
tes
your
parents.
parents
While some speakers prefer subjunctive with espérer (Anand & Hacquard 2012),
many speakers only allow indicative. The use of indicative is robustly attested by
published sources ((17a) is from Schlenker 2005; see also Farkas 1992; Achard
1996), speakers such as our consultant, and texts.
Because espérer is a desire predicate, the most natural approach is to treat it
similarly to vouloir. This implies that it has a buletic ordering source, and so it
should take the subjunctive under the proto-standard theory. The only real option for
the advocate of the proto-standard theory is to deny that it uses an ordering source, in
other words, to give it a non-comparative semantics. This is the approach of Portner
(1997) and Schlenker (2005), who propose a semantics along the lines of (18):
(18) [[ a espe´rer q ]] = True in w iff q is entailed by BUL(a,w).
However, allowing a non-comparative semantics for ‘hope’ would weaken the proto-
standard analysis considerably. The first problem is that, if a non-comparative
analysis is available for ‘hope’, why should languages not choose this as their sole
desire predicate? But instead, a subjunctive-selecting desire predicate seems to be
the norm, with an indicative-selecting desire predicate being somewhat marked.
Second, if it is possible to recast the semantics of a desire predicate into a non-
comparative form in order to predict indicative, we must deal with the fact that
almost any non-comparative semantics can be rewritten in a comparative way. For
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instance, we can give a comparative meaning for ‘believe’, as follows, dividing
DOX(a,w) into a modal base consisting of the propositions true in w and an ordering
source consisting of those which are not:
(19) [[ a believes q ]] = True inw iff q is better than¬q according to {p∈DOX(a,w) :
w ∈ p} and {p ∈ DOX(a,w) : w 6∈ p}.
This semantics is equivalent to the one given in (7). Hence, espérer poses a serious
problem for the proto-standard theory.
The next problem concerns promettre; it always selects indicative:7
(20) Marie
Marie
a
has
promis
promised
à
to
Bill
Bill
qu’elle
that she
amènerait
bring.COND.IND
le
the
dessert
dessert
à
to
la
the
fête.
party
Promettre reports the creation of an obligation, and in this way is similar to directives
(as pointed out by Zanuttini, Pak & Portner 2012). Its semantics must be comparative,
with an ordering source representing the kinds of worlds which the subject is
committed to bringing about (the To-do List of Portner 2004):
(21) [[ a promettre b q ]] = True in w iff a says something to b in w which makes it
the case that q is better than ¬q according to DOX(a,w) and TO–DO(a,w).
It is difficult to see how to account for promettre within the proto-standard theory.
The third problem concerns probable. This adjective is a modal predicate, similar
to ‘possible’, but takes the indicative in some cases:8
(22) Il
it
est
is
probable
probable
que
that
nous
we
avons
have.IND
là
there
un
a
état
case
plus
more
ou
or
moins
less
pur
pure
de
of
ε .
ε
(Dominique Barthélemy, Critique Textuelle de l’Ancien Testament, 1992)
(23) Saint-Loup
Saint-Loup
a
has
raison
reason
et
and
il
it
est
is
probable
probable
que
that
le
the
prochain
next
Service en
Service en
Campagne
Campagne
portera
carry.FUT.IND
la
the
trace
trace
de
of
cette
the
évolution,
evolution
dit
said
mon
my
voisin.
neighbor
‘Saint-Loup is right and it is probable that the next Service en Campagne will
show a trace of this evolution, said my neighbor.’
(Proust, Le Coté de Guermantes, 1920/1921)
Probable is analyzed within the ordering semantics framework as expressing weak
necessity (i.e., (4)), and so it should always select subjunctive. Yet it does not. The
comparison with possible is revealing: possible seems to sometimes express pure
7 Iatridou (2000: §6.2) argues that the conditional is a form of the indicative. If one thinks of it as a
third mood, it is nevertheless a problem for the proto-standard theory. Note that promettre also takes
(indicative) future; see footnote 11.
8 These examples were accessed via the Google N-gram viewer.
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circumstantial possibility, a meaning which can be represented in terms of an empty
ordering source, and so possible should be more compatible with the indicative than
probable. But it’s the other way around: probable, which always has a non-empty
ordering source, is the one which can, under certain circumstances, take indicative.
This contrast is hard to explain within the proto-standard approach.
3 Contextual Commitment
Our strategy for understanding why the problematical predicates from Section 2.4
select for the indicative will be to explore how they differ from similar predicates
which select for the subjunctive. We compare ‘hope’ to ‘want’, and ‘promise’
to ‘order’, showing that the indicative-taking attitude in each pair comes with a
requirement of contextual commitment: a requirement that the modal backgrounds of
the predicate, the facts and preferences it is based on, be conversationally defensible.
We argue that contextual commitment also characterizes the “objective” epistemic
modality that is conveyed by indicative-taking probable.
In this section we keep the discussion at an informal level. A more precise
account is provided in Section 4.
3.1 The difference between ‘want’ and ‘hope’
Both ‘want’ and ‘hope’ are attitudes of desire, but there are subtle differences in
the desires they describe. The differences emerge in scenarios like (24) and (25),
where the wishes of an individual are considered unreasonable or unacceptable in
the context.
(24) [You are at your doctor’s office for an annual checkup. He has just told you
what bad shape your lungs are in. If you continue to smoke, you will soon
die.]
(a) O
O
mon
my
Dieu!
God
Avec
with
tout
all
ce
this
stress,
stress
je
I
veux
want
vraiment
truly
fumer
smoke.INF
une
a
cigarette
cigarette
dès
from
que
that
je
I
sortirai.
leave
‘Oh gosh, Doctor, with all this stress I really want to have a cigarette as
soon as I leave!’
(b) ??O
O
mon
my
Dieu!
God
Avec
with
tout
all
ce
this
stress,
stress
j’espère
I hope
vraiment
truly
fumer
smoke.INF
une
a
cigarette
cigarette
dès
from
que
that
je
I
sortirai.
leave
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‘??Oh gosh, Doctor, with all this stress, I really hope to have a cigarette
as soon as I leave!’
If the patient were to use ‘hope’ in this context, in either French or English, she
would indicate that she is committed to the preference for a cigarette, in the sense
that she believes that it is reasonable and is willing to defend it to the doctor. These
commitments clash with the contextual assumptions in the scenario. In contrast, one
does not need to defend the kind of preferences described by ‘want’. It expresses a
visceral desire, and “I can’t help it” is valid as an explanation for the statement in
(24a). To use Bolinger’s (1974: 468-469) evocative terminology, ‘want’ expresses a
“glandular” preference, and ‘hope’ an “intellectual” one.
The same kind of contrast is visible with a finite complement in French:
(25) [The king is being bothered by an uppity bishop and makes his annoyance
known to some knights. These knights go and kill the bishop, and when
the king hears about it, he is angry because it makes him look bad with the
church. The knights respond with (a) or (b).]
(a) Mais
but
vous
you
vouliez
wanted
qu’il
that he
soit
be.SBJV
tué!
killed
‘But you wanted him to be killed!’
(b) ??Mais
but
vous
you
espériez
hoped
qu’il
that he
serait/est
be.COND.IND/is.IND
tué!
killed
‘??But you hoped for him to be killed!’
Again, we have a case of visceral desire, where the king is not contextually committed
to his preference. ‘Want’ is acceptable in this context, whereas ‘hope’ is not.9,10
Another aspect of the difference between ‘hope’ and ‘want’ is shown by (26):
(26) He doesn’t fully realize it yet, but Ron wants/??hopes to date Hermione.
It seems one must be cognizant of preferences one hopes for, but not necessarily of
those one wants. This difference makes sense on the assumption that commitment
9 Interestingly, our consultant suggested that the subjunctive would be better than the indicative in
the complement of (25b) in this context, but still not as natural as (25a). In general, this speaker
strongly prefers indicative with espérer. This fact suggests to us that the subjunctive can be chosen
by a speaker in an attempt to downplay the aspect of espérer’s meaning which is causing problems in
this context.
10 Another kind of infelicity with ‘hope’ is shown in (i).
(i) [Whispered to your friend:] I really want/??hope to have a cigarette after the talk ends.
We suggest that ‘hope’ is odd here because of a clash between the notion of commitment and the
ease with which the prejacent can be achieved. We thank Alexander Williams for this example.
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to a preference, in the relevant sense, requires being aware of it. Likewise, since it
is impossible to be committed to inconsistent preferences, conjunctions of ‘hope’
statements are expected to be infelicitous when one conjunct is based on a preference
that conflicts with the preference of the other conjunct. This is indeed the case, as
we see in (27b). Corresponding ‘want’ conjunctions are perfectly felicitous.
(27) (a) I want to marry Alice and I want to marry Sue.
(b) ??I hope to marry Alice and I hope to marry Sue.
Our explanation of the difference between these predicates is superior to one that
has been proposed by Portner (1992); Achard (1996); Anand & Hacquard (2012).
According to these authors, ‘hope’, but not ‘want’, requires the subject to believe
that the complement is possible. This view is supported by examples like (28):
(28) I want/??hope to build a perpetual motion machine.
(Of course, (28) with ‘hope’ is fine if spoken by someone who believes building
a perpetual motion machine is possible.) While the view that ‘hope’ presupposes
possibility may explain this example, it does not fully capture the difference between
the two predicates. In (24b), (25b), (26) and (27b), the attitude holder believes
each complement to be possible, yet the sentences with ‘hope’ are infelicitous.
Importantly, contextual commitment can explain (28) on the assumption that the
speaker would not be committed to its modal base because it is compatible with doing
something he knows to be impossible. Thus, the commitment approach captures the
intuition behind the idea that ‘hope’ requires that its complement be possible.
3.2 The difference between ‘promise’ and ‘order’
While promising and ordering are similar in that both create a priority for some agent
to undertake an action in the future, there are key differences between them which
are relevant to mood selection. We can illustrate the differences with (29)-(30).
(29) Marie
Marie
a
has
promis
promised
à
to
Bill
Bill
qu’elle
that she
amènerait
bring.COND.IND
le
the
dessert
dessert
à
to
la
the
fête.
party
‘Mary promised Bill to bring dessert to the party.’
(30) Marie
Marie
a
has
demandé
demanded
à
to
Bill
Bill
qu’il
that he
amène/fasse
bring/make.SBJV
le
the
dessert
dessert
à
to
la
the
fête.
party
‘Mary ordered Bill to bring dessert to the party.’
These are the first cases of mood selection we have discussed with both a subject
and an object individual argument. Notice that ‘promise’ reports an event where
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the subject places an obligation on herself, while ‘demand/order’ describes an event
where the subject attempts to place an obligation on the object. (This difference
corresponds to subject vs. object control when the complement is an infinitive, as
in the English translations.) This basic contrast between promising and ordering
connects with two other relevant differences. First, when a promise is made, it is
automatically in effect, while an order requires some kind of uptake.11 And second,
both the promiser and promisee must see the thing promised as preferable, as pointed
out by Searle (1965), while in contrast, the person ordered need not think that what
they are ordered to do is preferable.
All of these differences can be explained in terms of whether or not both of
the interlocutors are committed to the priority introduced by the predicate.12 Our
hypothesis is that, in order for indicative to be licensed, both (i.e., both the subject
and object) must be prepared to defend the priorities. With ‘promise’, this is the case.
The subject proposes to bind himself with a priority, and the object has no grounds
for disputing this. With ‘order’, in contrast, the priority may be controversial, and
while the subject proposes that it guide the object’s actions, this is not automatic and
the object may dispute it.
3.3 Differences among the modal adjectives
In the preceding subsections, we discussed the mood selection properties of verbs
in terms of whether the individual arguments of the verb would defend the modal
backgrounds associated with the verb. That is, with ‘want’, what we care about is
whether the subject is committed to his desires (not necessarily), and with ‘promise’
11 This difference in uptake can be seen in the following:
(i) A to B: Je
I
promets
promise
que
that
je
I
t’amènerai
bring.FUT.IND
le
the
dessert.
dessert
C to A: ?Qu’est ce que
what
tu
you
vas
go
faire?
do.INF?
Est-ce que
Q
tu
you
vas
go
amener
bring.INF
le
the
dessert?
dessert?
A to C: Huh?
(ii) A to B: J’ordonne
I order
que
that
tu
you
amènes
bring.SBJV
le
the
dessert.
dessert.
C to B: Qu’est ce que
What
tu
you
vas
go
faire?
do.INF?
Est-ce que
Q
tu
you
vas
go
amener
bring.INF
le
the
dessert?
dessert?
B to C: Non,
No
je
I
ne
neg
vais
go
pas
neg
le
it
faire.
do.INF
Ce
it
n’est
neg is
pas
neg
lui
he
qui
who
décide.
decides
12 Note that Farkas (1992) has the related idea that ‘promise’ selects indicative because the subject is
committed to the truth of the complement.
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it’s whether both the subject and object are committed to the priorities (they must
be). In this section, we look at the modal adjectives ‘probable’, ‘possible’, and
‘necessary’, which have no individual arguments. Thus, the question arises of whose
commitment would be relevant to mood selection. Our idea is that the speaker and
addressee play this role, so that indicative will be selected if they are both prepared
to defend the modal backgrounds, and subjunctive will be selected otherwise.
‘Probable’ is a modal that can be used to express an “objective” type of epis-
temic/evidential modality. This aspect of its meaning is brought out in the following
examples by Kratzer (1981: 57-58, examples renumbered):13
Imagine that Lenz, who often has bad luck, is going to leave the Old
World by boat, today, on Friday thirteenth. On hearing about this,
someone might utter one of the following sentences:
(31) Wahrscheinlich
Probably
sinkt
sinks
das
the
Schiff.
boat.
‘Probably, the boat will sink.’
(32) Es
It
ist
is
warscheinlich,
probable
daß
that
das
the
Schiff
boat
sinkt.
sinks.
‘It is probable that the boat will sink.’
Kratzer says, “In uttering [(31)], I make a more subjective claim than in uttering
[(32)]. I may be rather superstitious. I couldn’t defend my claim on objective
grounds. But I would have to do so if I uttered [(32)].” This sense of having to
“defend my claim” is part of what it means for there to be contextual commitment
towards the conversational backgrounds when ‘probable’ is used.
English shows a contrast between probable and likely that is of similar nature.14
With probable in (33), the speaker seems to be reporting on the basis of objective
data, such as an analysis of past patterns of voting. The concept of “objective”
evidence can be (at least partially) captured by the notion of contextual commitment:
the speaker would argue that the evidence is appropriate, and she presupposes that
any member of the community (including the addressee) would agree that it is. With
likely, the statement manages to convey a more subjective opinion: while the speaker
treats the evidence for the movie winning as appropriate, she does not assume that
anyone else would agree. Only likely can be used, for example, if the speaker’s
judgment is based entirely on gut feeling.
13 This discussion has been removed from the reworked version of the paper in Kratzer 2012.
14 Like German warscheinlich, the English adverb probably is more “subjective” than its adjective
counterpart. We don’t discuss the relevance of part of speech to the readings of modals here.
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(33) [A and B are talking about the upcoming Academy Awards, and A says:]
It is probable/likely that Wings of Desire will win the Academy Award.
French probable to some extent covers the ground of both ‘probable’ and ‘likely’.
Thus, it makes sense from our point of view that it would allow both indicative and
subjunctive. We suggest, based on examples like (22)-(23), that indicative is possible
only on the objective reading. We account for this in Section 4 by proposing a
stylistically marked form of the adjective which allows indicative when commitment
is presupposed, in addition to a “normal” lexical entry for probable compatible with
both objective and subjective readings, and which selects subjunctive.
Next, we turn to subjunctive-taking nécessaire. On the proto-standard approach,
‘necessary’ works fine because it can be claimed to always have an ordering source.
On our approach, having an ordering source is not enough to trigger selection of
the subjunctive; the question is whether or not the modal implies commitment to
the content of the ordering source. In (34), the challenge is that the speaker seems
committed to the priorities which would require taking the A train.
(34) Il
it
est
is
nécessaire
necessary
que
that
vous
you
preniez
take.SBJV
le
the
train
train
A.
A
We explain (34) with the idea that, while the speaker is committed to the modal
backgrounds, the addressee need not be. Let’s say that the reason the speaker asserts
(34) is that the A train is the only one which has a stop within a short walk of the
destination. He is committed to this priority. However, the addressee need not share
it. She could respond with “No, it’s a beautiful day, and I’d enjoy a long walk. I’ll
take another train which leaves me all the way across the park from home.” This
shows that the addressee is not presupposed to be committed to the priority assumed
by the speaker. To be more precise, if (34) is accepted as true by the addressee, she
is committed to the priority of avoiding a long walk, but prior to that point, it is still
up for debate. Another way to put it is that a sentence with ‘necessary’ proposes
that the interlocutors become committed to the priorities assumed by the speaker
(Rubinstein 2012), in addition to asserting that the modal necessity claim is true
under those priorities. Because nécessaire does not presuppose commitment towards
the priorities on the part of the addressee, it selects subjunctive.
And finally, we make a few comments about the weak modal possible. We
assume that it takes the subjunctive for the same reason as the “normal” version of
probable, i.e. because it does not require an objective interpretation. The difference
is that probable is ambiguous, and also has a special, indicative-compatible lexical
entry which can be used by some speakers in situations in which the objectivity of
the evidence is highlighted. In other words, the inherent flexibility of the modal
adjectives leads to their selecting subjunctive, and it takes an entry which carves out
a subset of the uses to allow indicative.
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4 Towards a formalization of mood selection based on contextual commit-
ment
In this section, we discuss the concept of contextual commitment in detail and take
initial steps towards formalizing it. Based on the discussion in Section 3, we show
that it predicts the mood selection properties of many key examples in French.
4.1 Formal proposals
Assumed representation and composition. We suggest that the fact that a given
predicate selects for the indicative or subjunctive should be represented composi-
tionally on the predicate itself. The features [+_indic] and [+_sub j] attach to a verb
or adjective, and license a mood morpheme in that predicate’s complement clause.15
The indicative feature additionally introduces, in the form of a presupposition, a
commitment requirement towards the predicate’s modal backgrounds; the subjunc-
tive feature has no semantic effect at all. We will go through the major pieces of this
approach one at a time.
In (35), we see [+_indic] adjoined to the matrix verb croit, and then adjoined to
the whole complex we have the verb’s modal backgrounds f and g.
(35) Pierre
Pierre
[[ [+_ indic] croit] 〈 f ,g〉]
believes
que
that
Marie
Marie
être-indic
be-indic
heureuse.
happy
The semantic function of [+_indic] is to require that all of the individual arguments
of its sister be committed to that sister’s modal backgrounds. How exactly one writes
down this semantics depends on one’s assumptions about the semantics of attitude
verbs. We assume a kind of partial neo-Davidsonian decomposition, with a sentence
with ‘believe’ represented as follows (minus any contribution of mood):
(36) a believes S⇒ λw∃e[e< w∧Overlaps(e,now)∧Bel(e)∧Agent(e, [[ a ]] )∧
f (e) and g(e) represent [[ a ]] ’s beliefs in e ∧[[ S ]] is a necessity with respect
to f (e) and g(e)]
Lexical entries for ‘believe’ and ‘probable’ are given in (37)-(38):
(37) [[ believe/croire ]] = [λBλ pλe. Bel(e)∧B(e) represents the content of e∧ p
is a necessity with respect to B(e)]
(38) [[ probable ]] = [λBλ pλe : B is evidential or circumstantial ∧ B is relevant in
e . p is a necessity with respect to B(e)]
As should be clear, B is a tuple of modal backgrounds (which are now functions from
events to sets of propositions; Hacquard 2006, 2010), B(e) applies each component
15 The underscore in [+_indic] indicates that the feature licenses indicative in the complement.
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of B to e, and p is the denotation of the complement clause. We assume that
other arguments (for example, the subject in the case of ‘believe’ and ‘want’, and
the subject and object in the case of ‘order’ and ‘promise’) are introduced via
thematic roles. This is how Agent(e, [[ a ]] ) comes to be part of (36).16 The clause
“B represents the content of e” states that the modal backgrounds in B represent the
beliefs of the attitude holder of e; in other words, they are both doxastic.17
The presuppositions of mood morphemes. When indicative is adjoined to a modal
element, it introduces a presupposition to the effect that all individuals related by
thematic roles to the event argument of that predicate are committed to all of the
modal backgrounds associated with the predicate (39a). Beyond this presupposition,
it has no effect and simply denotes the identity function. The subjunctive represents
the absence of this contextual restriction (39b), and so in a sense it is the default
mood (Portner 1997; Schlenker 2005; Siegel 2009).
(39) (a) [[ [+_indic] ]] = [λPλBλ pλe : all individuals who bear thematic roles
associated with e are committed in e to all components of B . P(B)(p)(e)]
(b) [[ [+_sub j] ]] = [λPλBλ pλe . P(B)(p)(e)]
When a verb or adjective takes a finite clause in French, it must be associated with
either [+_indic] or [+_sub j], in order to license the mood morpheme in its comple-
ment. While there is almost certainly some amount of grammaticalization in this
association (so that, for instance, possible is associated with [+_sub j] in the lexicon),
here we will explain the system as if the choice is semantically determined.18 In
particular, we will argue that [+_indic], and not [+_sub j], is adjoined to croire
because the presupposition introduced by the former is guaranteed to be satisfied,
in virtue of the nature of believing events. And likewise, [+_sub j] is adjoined to
vouloir because the presupposition [+_indic] introduces would not typically be
satisfied, in virtue of the nature of wanting events.
At last, we reach the central piece of our proposal, the definition of commitment.
Commitment is a relation between an individual (for example, the attitude holder in
a belief event) and a modal background.
(40) An individual a is COMMITTED TO a modal background h in event e iff a
is disposed/prepared in e to argue for h(e) in a conversationally appropriate
way (e.g., by arguing that it is rational/proper/sensible/wise) in any relevant
conversation c.
16 The rest of the material otherwise unaccounted for in (36), such as “Overlaps(e,now)”, comes from
other functional projections, like tense.
17 It might be that g(e) is empty. The pair of a doxastic f and empty g would also be appropriate.
18 We will reintroduce the issue of grammaticalized mood marking in 4.3 below.
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We should make clear that in saying that a is prepared to argue in favor of a
modal background in a conversation c, we do not require that he actually argue in
favor of it. For one thing, while a must be a party in c, the conversation can be
purely hypothetical. It is certainly possible to believe and hope things in solitary
confinement. Additionally, there may be stronger reasons not to make the argument
(such as politeness or a need for secrecy). Often, however, when it is relevant and
there is no stronger reason not to, a does argue in favor of the modal background in
an actual conversation. In (41), openly entails that Romney’s beliefs have been made
public; being beliefs, they will have been defended as appropriate.
(41) He [Romney] openly believes life begins at conception.19
4.2 Discussion of some of the key examples
In this section, we go through a number of attitude verbs and one modal adjective to
show how their mood selection properties are explained on our proposal. Though
we cannot cover all of the important cases, we will discuss both some of the core
cases which worked well in the proto-standard analysis (‘say’, ‘believe’, ‘want’,
‘order’) and some tricky ones which were problematical for that approach (‘hope’,
‘probable’, ‘promise’).
Example: ‘say’. Perhaps the most straightforward verb to explain under our analysis
is dire ‘say’, which takes the indicative when it has a finite complement (and positive
polarity). In the literature on mood, it is assumed that ‘say’ is associated with a
modal base (or simple accessibility relation), representing the common ground of
the reported conversation, and no ordering source. If we adopt these ideas, it is clear
that the subject argument is contextually committed to this modal base; an individual
must be prepared to defend the propositions he overtly presupposes, and this modal
base represents shared presuppositions. As a result, the presupposition of [+_indic]
is guaranteed to be satisfied and the feature is adjoined to dire.20
Example: ‘believe’. In French, croire takes the indicative. This verb is associated
with a doxastic modal background as its modal base, and perhaps also with an
additional doxastic background as ordering source. The subject of ‘believe’ is
necessarily committed to these backgrounds, which after all represent his beliefs: he
must be disposed to argue in favor of them, in any relevant conversation. As a result,
the presupposition of [+_indic] will always be satisfied, and the feature is therefore
adjoined to croire in every sentence in which it takes a finite complement.
19 http://www.971talk.com/2012/PresidentIssues/abortion.aspx
20 While [+_sub j] would not lead to any semantic or pragmatic problems, we assume that [+_indic]
must be chosen as a case of Maximize Presupposition (Heim 1991). This applies to ‘believe’ as well.
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Example: ‘hope’. We focus on those speakers for whom espérer selects the in-
dicative, and we assume that it has a doxastic modal base and an “intellectual”,
“non-glandular” buletic ordering source. The presupposition of commitment towards
the ordering source explains the doctor example, (24b): because of [+_indic] the
speaker should be disposed to defend the preference for the cigarette in a relevant
conversation, and the actual conversation with the doctor certainly counts as rele-
vant. But he cannot defend the preference in that conversation, since the doctor has
explained that it is not wise, and the doctor retains authority on such matters. The
commitment towards the doxastic modal base is apparent in the perpetual motion
example (28b). There is no contextually appropriate argument the speaker can mount
in favor of the beliefs which would allow this sentence to have non-trivial truth
conditions.
Example: ‘want’. Wanting, like hoping, is an attitude of desire, but vouloir takes
the subjunctive. Vouloir has a modal base and ordering source similar to the ones
used by espérer, but the agent need not be committed to either of them. The doctor
example (24a) shows that there’s no problem using ‘want’ to express a preference
which one cannot defend within the conversation. Similarly, there’s no problem
using ‘want’ in (28a), even though one cannot argue in favor of all of the propositions
which would need to be in the background in order for it to be true.
Bolinger’s (1974) description of ‘want’ as being “glandular”, rather than “in-
tellectual”, is helpful. In our terms, this aspect of ‘want’ is reflected in the kind
of ordering source it uses. One cannot help one’s glandular-buletic preferences,
and because of this, there’s no guarantee they will be defensible. Nevertheless,
we may want to describe them, so a verb like ‘want’ is essential. The modal base
used with this type of ordering source likewise cannot be restricted to a defensible,
doxastic one, since one may think that one’s glandular preferences are unrealizable.
When this is the case, the doxastic modal base must be revised, perhaps in the way
proposed by Heim (1992), to include worlds in which the relevant preferences are
realized.
Although this approach to the semantics of ‘want’ makes clear why subjunctive
would be the natural choice in the complement of this verb, we cannot give a purely
semantic explanation for why vouloir is never able to take the indicative. It is
theoretically possible (though not typical) for someone’s glandular desires to be a
subset of her rationally defensible preferences, in which case the presupposition of
the indicative would be satisfied. Hence, we need a mechanism for representing the
grammatical association of vouloir with subjunctive, and we model this by assuming
that it has become linked with [+_sub j] in the lexicon. That is, the verb is inserted
into the phrase marker with the feature [+_sub j] already adjoined to it.
Example: ‘probable’. Probable usually takes the subjunctive, but selects the
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indicative in certain especially “objective” contexts, like academic writing. We
assume that it can utilize epistemic/evidential or circumstantial modal backgrounds
and that it always has both a modal base and an ordering source.21 An evidential
background determines a set of propositions treated as evidence in a particular event
e; a circumstantial background picks out relevant facts concretely realized in the
event. On the evidential reading, e.g. (42a), this event is the speech event, and the
individual participants in it are the speaker and addressee. On the circumstantial
reading, the relevant event is one which includes the relevant circumstances, and it
need not have any participants. In (42b), it is a situation containing the mine before
it exploded.22
(42) (a) It is probable that we have a more or less pure case of ε . [cf. (22)]
(b) It was probable that the mine would not explode (but it did).
We model the complex distribution of mood with probable in French by assuming
that there are two entries for probable in the lexicon: one which is associated with
[+_sub j], just as with other modal adjectives, and one which is not associated with
either mood feature. The second form will allow indicative, when the presupposition
associated with [+_indic] is satisfied.23 Example (22) illustrates the kind of context
which leads to indicative with probable. The event which [+_indic] takes as an
argument is the speech event, and we assume that the author is the one treating the
modal background as evidence in this event. Since he is clearly committed to these
evidential backgrounds in the “conversation” between author and reader, and in this
case assumes that the reader has accepted his evidence, the presupposition of the
indicative feature is satisfied.
Example: ‘promise’. The next two cases are ‘promise’, which takes the indicative,
and ‘order’, which takes the subjunctive. Both have two individual arguments,
21 We are setting aside examples which express numerical degrees of probability, like It is 99% probable
that it’s an ε . Such examples have motivated the proposal that the meaning of probable is always to
be stated in terms of mathematical probabilities (Yalcin 2007, 2010; Lassiter 2011). As far as we
know, no theory of verbal mood has been developed in terms of this approach, but if our main claims
in this paper are correct, in order to explain mood selection within this theory, one would have to find
a way of connecting the concept of contextual commitment with the numerical probabilities.
22 We do not know whether circumstantial examples like (42b) ever take indicative, and so in this paper
we will not try to integrate them into the analysis. On the circumstantial reading, the event need not
have any participants, so it is not clear how the presupposition of commitment would apply. Perhaps
it’s vacuously satisfied when there are no participants, or perhaps the indicative further presupposes
that there is at least one participant who can be committed. We note that French probabilité (que),
which like its English counterpart probability seems to mainly be used in a circumstantial sense,
takes the subjunctive in the cases we have examined.
23 It would also technically work to associate the second lexical entry with [+_indic], but this would
add an unnecessary stipulation.
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and the modal backgrounds express properties of a context in which those two
individuals interact. With both, the modal base represents the common ground of the
reported context. The ordering source of ‘promise’ is a subset of the To-do List of the
promiser representing those commitments for which the promisee holds the promiser
accountable (Zanuttini et al. 2012). Searle (1965) notes two important conditions on
successful acts of promising: first, that the promisee must prefer that the promise be
fulfilled, and second, that the promiser must intend to keep the promise.24 Given
these points, promettre meets the conditions for licensing the indicative. Both the
promiser and promisee are committed to the modal backgrounds, both the modal
base and, crucially, the priorities in the ordering source.
Example: ‘order’. In contrast to ‘promise’, the object of ‘order’ need not be
committed to the deontic ordering source associated with this predicate. Obviously,
one can be ordered to do something which one believes not to be wise or proper, and
as a result the ordering source itself may come to contain propositions which this
individual would not defend. Because the commitment condition associated with
[+_indic] is not in general satisfied with ordonner, [+_sub j] has become associated
with the latter feature in the lexicon, and it uniformly selects subjunctive.
4.3 Semantic versus lexical mood selection
In Section 4.1, we gave a semantically based definition of mood. We proposed
that indicative mood is licensed by a feature which introduces a presupposition of
commitment towards the modal backgrounds. However, in Section 4.2, we suggested
that a mood-licensing feature could be associated with a lexical item in the lexicon,
and crucially a lexically-associated token of [+_sub j] will license subjunctive mood
(blocking association with [+_indic]), even if the presupposition of [+_indic] would
be satisfied in the context. This type of grammaticalization was proposed for vouloir,
probable, and ordonner. In the cases we have discussed, there is no parallel example
of grammaticalized licensing of indicative. Although this contrast may only be an
accident of the items we have thus-far investigated, if it holds up more generally, it
does make sense in terms of our theory. Because the subjunctive is the default form,
lacking a presupposition of its own (it does not mark lack of commitment, but rather
only fails to mark commitment), when it is the grammaticalized form, there is no
presupposition which needs to be ignored or overridden. In contrast, if we eventually
find cases of grammaticalized indicative when the commitment condition is not met,
they will be grammaticalized in the stronger sense that a feature, [+_indic], has been
24 Searle also discusses relevant cases in which ‘promise’ does not report a promise, but rather has the
function of emphasizing commitment. For example: ‘You stole that money, didn’t you?’ – ‘No, I
didn’t, I promise you I didn’t’ (Searle 1965: 261 in Davis, ed.).
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disassociated from its compositional meaning.
5 Comparison with previous work
Although we cannot achieve a thorough comparison in such a short paper, we wish
to briefly discuss previous work which is based on a similar intuition as ours.
Our approach finds inspiration in the informal descriptions of mood by Bolinger
(1974) and Puskas (2012). By looking at a number of specific constructions, such as
performative sentences and complement preposing, Bolinger supports a traditional
description of Spanish mood as representing “two ways of looking at reality, one
intellectual, one attitudinal.” Similarly, Puskas proposes that a distinction between
“cognitive” and “emotive” attitudes explains the indicative/subjunctive contrast in
French. These contrasts can be associated, formally, with the absence or presence of
an ordering source representing the attitudinal/emotive content. In addition, Bolinger
claims that the indicative is chosen in cases in which the pragmatic function of a
subordinate clause is similar to what it would have if it were not subordinated, and
perhaps one could see this as related to contextual commitment.
Thinking about the indicative in terms of contextual commitment captures the
persistent intuition in the literature that indicative-selecting attitudes take into account
all the relevant things that an attitude holder takes to be true – be it in reality, in
the context of a dream, or in a conversation (Farkas 1992; Giannakidou 1994,
1995, 1997, 1999; Quer 2001). An attitude holder would defend all and only those
propositions that he or she thinks accurately describe the relevant “reality”, and
thus there is an overlap between Giannakidou’s notion of veridicality and contextual
commitment to epistemic backgrounds. But as we have argued, there can also be
commitment to priorities, represented as ordering sources, as in the cases of ‘hope’
and ‘promise’. Additionally, indicative-selecting probable could not be explained in
terms of veridicality and the speaker’s epistemic model, since the complement clause
is not true throughout all of the speaker’s belief worlds; a new type of epistemic
model, a subset of the speaker’s epistemic model, would have to be assumed.
Inspired by recent proposals within the proto-standard approach, we have fol-
lowed Villalta (2006, 2008) and Smirnova (2011) in separating the semantic contri-
bution of the mood markers from that of the embedding predicates. An important
addition to this approach is found in the proposals of Quer (2001) and Smirnova
(2011), which aim to capture cases of variable mood selection (with emotive factives
in Spanish and with predicates like ‘remember’ in Bulgarian, respectively). It seems
to us that, because we also separate the meaning of mood from the attitude predicate,
this variability may also be explicable in terms of contextual commitment, but we do
not have space to pursue this possibility here.
Next we will briefly compare our ideas to several recent proposals which do not
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fall under the general framework of the proto-standard theory. According to Siegel
(2009), indicative marks speaker commitment towards the truth of the complement,
and in this respect her proposal shares an intuitive link with ours. However, the
accounts of key facts are rather different. According to Siegel, emotive factives select
subjunctive in Romance because marking speaker commitment via indicative would
be redundant with the presupposition of the factive predicate. She accounts for the
cases discussed by Quer in which the complement of an emotive factive is indicative;
these complements are asserted rather than presupposed, and so speaker commitment
can be non-redundantly marked by the indicative. She also aims to explain certain
contrasts between Romance and Balkan by proposing that in Balkan the indicative
marks subject commitment, rather than speaker commitment. Although Siegel’s
analysis shares much with ours, it is not easy to see how it could explain the difficult
cases of indicative discussed in this paper: with ‘hope’, ‘promise’, and ‘probable’,
the speaker is not in general committed to the truth of the complement. Rather,
subject commitment to modal backgrounds seems to work better.
Portner (1997) argues that the Italian indicative is associated with verbs that
are prototypically factive, in the sense that, for typical situations s in the domain of
the verb’s modal background B, the world of s is in B(s). Portner’s analysis seems
to be contradicted by emotive factives, but he suggests that these are not attitudes
towards sets of worlds, but rather sets of (sub-world) situations; in this regard, his
proposal is similar to that of Farkas (1992). He also acknowledges a problem with
‘say’ and other similar cases, since his proposal relies on the idea that in “typical”
cases, what one says is true. Contextual commitment seems to better explain why
‘say’ is associated with the indicative.
Schlenker (2005) also proposes an analysis of indicative related to the concept
of contextual commitment. Building on Stalnaker’s (1975) analysis of conditionals,
he proposes that the indicative mood presupposes that the world at which its clause
is evaluated is within the context set of “a speech or thought event e.” A significant
problem for this theory is that the choice of anchoring event e is not grammatically
determined; sometimes it is the matrix verb’s event argument, sometimes the root
speech event. This means that he cannot answer such questions as why indicative
cannot be selected with vouloir, if the speaker believes the complement to be certain.
Nevertheless, Schlenker’s proposal to analyze the indicative in terms of a generalized
notion of context set expresses an intuition close to ours. The key difference is
that where our account looks at both the modal base and ordering source, and
considers contextual commitment towards them, his analysis only looks at whether
each accessible world is compatible with the discourse context set or modal base.
An interesting direction which deserves further thought is suggested by Farkas
(2003). Although the core idea of the proto-standard analysis is central to Farkas’s
analysis, she argues that mood choice cross-linguistically cannot be explained with a
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single semantic feature. She proposes two features: [±Assert], which is related to
comparison, and [±Decided], which separates core subjunctive-taking predicates
from emotive factives. These features determine mood choice through their relative
ranking in an OT model. Although Farkas’s analysis of the subjunctive runs into
many of the problems of the proto-standard theory generally, the way that it combines
multiple features in the analysis of mood selection is potentially important. From our
perspective, it raises the possibility of combining the insights of the proto-standard
theory with our own. Perhaps the presence/absence of a comparative semantics
and contextual commitment are both relevant. Although we are unable to pursue
the idea here, we would like to raise the possibility that simple modal predicates
like nécessaire and possible select subjunctive because their semantics involves an
ordering source, as on the proto-standard account. Contextual commitment might
only be relevant to mood selection in constructions in which there is an explicit
attitude holder. Making use of two (or more) factors would make it easier to explain
cross-linguistic variation, something we have not attempted here.25
Finally, our proposal that mood selection tracks contextual commitment to con-
versational backgrounds is directly inspired by the analysis proposed by Rubinstein
(2012) to account for differences in modal strength among necessity modals. Ru-
binstein argues that the relative weakness of ought, as compared to have to or must,
stems from the modal’s dependence on assumptions that are presupposed not to
be collectively committed to in the conversation. Our analysis builds on a similar
idea to account for the meaning contribution of subjunctive, in contrast to indicative
mood, thereby supporting the relevance of factors like contextual commitment to
modal semantics more generally.
6 Summary
Our goal has been to argue for the following main points:
• The proto-standard theory has problems with certain indicative-selecting items.
• Indicative mood marks the presence of contextual commitment.
• Contextual commitment can be explained precisely, and integrated into a plau-
sible model of grammar and meaning.
Although many issues remain to be resolved, and clearly our paper has only dealt with
a single language, we hope to have shown that contextual commitment is an important
factor in mood selection, and that the role it plays in semantics and pragmatics can
be made precise within a linguistically realistic theoretical framework.
25 Giorgi & Pianesi (1997) also use multiple properties to account for cross-linguistic variation, but be-
cause the “non-null ordering source” property of the proto-standard theory is the strictest subjunctive
property, a predicate with this property is predicted to select subjunctive across all languages.
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